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35 
LEVIN V. COMMERCE ENERGY: ONE STEP 
FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 
MARSHALL BROAD† 
 The foundation of the United States government is rooted in 
federalism, “[t]he legal relationship and distribution of power 
between the national and regional governments within a federal 
system of government.”1  That concept is expressed through 
comity, the principle that political entities will respect the acts of 
other political entities, whether those acts be legislative, 
executive, or judicial.2  As applied to the relationship between 
federal and state courts, Justice Black penned the quintessential 
definition: 
‘[C]omity’ . . . is, a proper respect for state functions, a 
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a 
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the 
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States 
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate 
functions in their separate ways.3 
In practice, comity means that federal courts will not interfere 
with state administration—including, but not limited to, criminal 
proceedings, interpretation of state law, and tax 
administration—as long as the “asserted federal right may be 
preserved without [such interference].”4  From 1871 to 1939, 
federal courts exclusively relied on comity to decline jurisdiction 
over lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws.5  
In 1939, the Congress codified the principle of comity as applied 
to state tax laws in the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), which forbids 
federal courts from interfering with the “assessment, levy, or 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s School 
of Law; B.A., College of William and Mary, 2004. 
1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009). In the United States, that power 
is divided between the federal government and the individual state governments. 
2 Id. at 303–04. 
3 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
4 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932). 
5 See, e.g., Dows v. City of Chi., 78 U.S. 108 (1870). 
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collection” of a state tax as long as a “plain, speedy, and efficient 
remedy” is available in state court.6  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court continued to use comity as a bar to lawsuits challenging 
state taxes alongside the TIA.7  In 2004, however, the Supreme 
Court held in Hibbs v. Winn that a lawsuit by a third party 
challenging a state tax credit could proceed in federal court and 
that neither the TIA nor comity barred the action.8  As a result, 
several circuit courts held that comity should only be applied to a 
lawsuit challenging a state tax if the relief requested would 
disrupt the state’s tax revenue.9  One circuit court held that 
comity had not been so constrained by Hibbs, reasoning that the 
Hibbs decision was limited to the unusual facts presented in that 
case.10 
Recently, in Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., the Supreme 
Court considered the scope of Hibbs’s limitation of comity in 
order to resolve the circuit split.11  Levin dealt with tax 
exemptions offered by Ohio to natural gas providers.  Ohio 
residents who wish to purchase natural gas may do so from one 
of two alternatives: a local distribution company (“LDC”) or an 
independent marketer (“IM”).12  Under Ohio tax law, LDCs 
receive several tax exemptions that IMs do not.13  In response to 
these tax exemptions, two IMs—plaintiffs Commerce Energy, 
 
6 Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 
586, 592 (1995) (relying on principles of comity to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does 
not allow for injunctive or declaratory relief in suits challenging state taxes). 
8 542 U.S. 88, 94 (2004). 
9 See Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 17 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Commerce Energy, Inc. v. Levin, 554 F.3d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 2009); Levy v. 
Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 2007); Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1109–10 
(9th Cir. 2005). Each of these cases cited to the same language, found in a single 
footnote, from Hibbs. See, e.g., Commerce Energy, Inc., 554 F.3d at 1099 (citing 
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004)). 
10 DIRECTV v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 127–28 (4th Cir. 2008). 
11 Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010). 
12 Id. at 2328. The primary difference between LDCs and IMs is that LDCs both 
sell and deliver natural gas to customers, since they own and operate the pipelines 
necessary to transport the gas. Id. IMs merely sell the gas and rely on the LDCs to 
deliver it for them. Id. 
13 Id. (“First, LDCs’ natural gas sales are exempt from sales and use taxes. 
LDCs owe instead a gross receipts excise tax, which is lower than the sales and use 
taxes IMs must collect. Second, LDCs are not subject to the commercial activities tax 
imposed on IMs’ taxable gross receipts. Finally, Ohio law excludes inter-LDC 
natural gas sales from the gross receipts tax, which IMs must pay when they 
purchase gas from LDCs.” (citations omitted)). 
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Inc. and Interstate Gas Supply, Inc.—as well as a customer of 
Interstate Gas Supply—plaintiff Gregory Slone—brought suit in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against 
Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio.14  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the tax exemptions enjoyed by the LDCs were 
discriminatory in nature and violated both the Commerce and 
Equal Protection Clauses.15  The plaintiffs requested declaratory 
and injunctive relief so that the LDCs could no longer take 
advantage of the exemptions.16   
At trial, the defendant made a motion to dismiss on several 
grounds, including that both the TIA and comity barred the 
plaintiffs’ suit.17  The district court granted the motion to dismiss 
on comity grounds.18  The district court first held that the TIA did 
not bar the suit, because the plaintiffs were challenging a third-
party’s tax benefit and the relief requested would not negatively 
affect state revenue.19  The court reasoned, however, that comity 
would bar the suit, because the relief requested by the plaintiffs 
would force Ohio to collect more taxes than its legislature had 
desired and such interference with state taxation by federal 
courts would be inappropriate.20  While a state court could either 
remove the exemptions or extend them to the plaintiffs, 
according to the district court, the Tax Injunction Act would only 
allow a federal court to do the former, and a federal court should 
not impose one remedy on a state when two possible remedies are 
available.21  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court.22  The Sixth Circuit agreed that the TIA did not bar the 
suit but disagreed that comity would bar it.23  Relying on a 
footnote from Hibbs v. Winn, the court held that comity could 
only be used to decline jurisdiction over a suit challenging a state 
tax law if the suit would disrupt state tax collection.24  The court 
 
14 Id. at 2328–29. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 2329. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004)). 
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expressed concern that “[a] broad view of the comity 
cases . . . would render the TIA ‘effectively superfluous.’ ”25  It 
concluded that the suit would not intrude on state tax 
administration and remanded the case for trial.26  In so holding, 
the Sixth Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, which had also held that footnote nine of the Hibbs 
decision had narrowed the scope of comity.27 
Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for certiorari, which 
the Supreme Court granted in order to resolve the circuit split 
regarding the scope of the comity doctrine following Hibbs v. 
Winn.28 
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the decision in Hibbs v. Winn,29 
delivered the Court’s decision.  The Court first characterized the 
lawsuit as one challenging an uneven tax burden, thus 
distinguishing Levin from Hibbs, which concerned a state tax 
benefit enjoyed by a third party.30  Thus, Levin did not fall under 
the exceptions to comity created by the TIA or by Court in Hibbs.  
Echoing the district court’s reasoning, the Court then held that 
comity precluded the federal courts from hearing the plaintiff’s’ 
lawsuit.31  The Court dismissed the argument of the Sixth Circuit 
regarding the relationship between comity and the TIA, noting 
that Congress passed the TIA to close two loopholes in the comity 
doctrine.32  Finally, the Court declined to address the issue of 
“whether the TIA would itself block the suit,” relying on the  
 
 
 
 
 
25 Id. (quoting Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 554 F.3d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 
2009), rev’d, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010)). 
26 Id. at 2330. 
27 Id. at 2329 (citing Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2007); Wilbur v. 
Locke, 423 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
28 Id. at 2330. 
29 542 U.S. 88. 
30 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2335 (“The plaintiffs in Hibbs were outsiders to the tax 
expenditure, ‘third parties’ whose own tax liability was not a relevant factor. In this 
case, by contrast, the very premise of respondents’ suit is that they are taxed 
differently from LDCs. Unlike the Hibbs plaintiffs, respondents do object to their 
own tax situation, measured by the allegedly more favorable treatment accorded 
LDCs.”). 
31 Id. at 2334. 
32 Id. at 2336 (“By closing these loopholes, Congress secured the doctrine against 
diminishment.”). 
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principle that, when a federal court is confronted with two 
different but equally valid grounds for dismissal, it may choose 
whichever grounds it wants to dismiss a case.33   
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Hibbs 
v. Winn,34 filed a brief concurrence, which restated his objection 
to the rationale used by the Court in Hibbs, and expressed his 
understanding that the Levin opinion did not expand Hibbs’s 
holding.35  Justice Alito also filed a brief concurrence, expressing 
“doubt[ ] about the Court’s efforts to distinguish [Hibbs],”  and 
declining to comment on “whether [the Court’s] holding 
undermines Hibbs’ foundations.”36 
Justice Thomas filed a more extensive opinion concurring in 
the judgment, in which Justice Scalia joined.37  He began by 
echoing the skepticism of Justice Kennedy regarding the 
rationale of the Hibbs decision, noting that Hibbs did not 
preclude application of comity or the TIA to the present case.38  
Though Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that the case 
could be dismissed on comity grounds, he argued that the case 
should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds under the TIA, 
arguing that the court had misinterpreted its holding in 
Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping 
Corp.39  Rather than standing for the proposition that a federal 
court may choose between two equally valid grounds for 
dismissal, Justice Thomas argued that, under Sinochem, a 
federal court should dismiss on jurisdictional grounds as long as 
it would not require an “arduous inquiry.”40  Justice Thomas 
concluded by offering an explanation for the majority’s decision to  
 
 
 
33 Id. at 2336–37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. 
v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007)). 
34 See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 112–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
35 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2337 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
36 Id. at 2339 (Alito, J., concurring). 
37 Id. at 2337–39 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
38 Id. at 2337. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2338 (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 
U.S. 422, 436 (2007)) (stating that judicial economy is the primary concern when a 
federal court is confronted with two valid grounds for dismissal). Though various 
federal courts have referred to “declining jurisdiction” when applying the comity 
doctrine, comity is not a jurisdictional ground for dismissal. Id. at 2337. Rather, 
comity is a “prudential doctrine.” Id. at 2336. 
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dismiss on comity grounds rather than jurisdictional grounds: a 
desire to “leave the door open” to hearing certain cases in federal 
court rather than state court.41 
Part I of this Comment examines the Court’s application of 
the comity doctrine.  Specifically, Part I looks at the Court’s 
attempts to distinguish its holding in Hibbs from its prior comity 
holdings.  Part I then critiques the Court’s application of comity 
in both Hibbs and Levin in light of its analysis in the latter and 
argues that its decision in Levin did not go far enough in limiting 
the holding of Hibbs.  Part II analyzes the Court’s decision not to 
address whether the TIA would apply to Levin.  Part II concludes 
that the Court incorrectly exercised its discretion when it chose 
to not discuss the TIA and that its authority for doing so was 
misplaced. 
I. THE OLD HIBBS RULE AND THE NEW LEVIN RULE 
In footnote nine of the Hibbs decision, the Court wrote it has 
“relied upon ‘principles of comity’ . . . to preclude original federal-
court jurisdiction only when plaintiffs have sought district-court 
aid in order to arrest or countermand state tax collection.”42  On 
its face, the language from Hibbs supports the First, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ conclusion that comity only applies 
when a plaintiff’s requested relief would disrupt state tax 
collection.  Despite this, some authorities understood the Court’s 
statement with respect to comity to be a narrow one.43  The latter 
view is more in line with the Court’s comity precedent. 
Clearly unhappy with how the circuit courts had interpreted 
the footnote, the Court sought to narrow the scope of the Hibbs 
exception by distinguishing Hibbs from Levin.44  In Hibbs, an 
 
41 Id. at 2338–39 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
42 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004). 
43 See Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Hibbs, therefore, 
leaves the doors of the federal court open to a narrow category of state tax 
challenges.” (emphasis added)); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 
2005) (“Hibbs opened the federal courthouse doors slightly notwithstanding the 
limits of the TIA, but it did so only where (1) a third party (not the taxpayer) files 
suit, and (2) the suit’s success will enrich, not deplete, the government entity’s 
coffers.” (emphasis added)); see also Paul V. McCord, The Dormant Commerce Clause 
and the MBT Credit and Incentive Scheme: You Can’t Get There from Here, 53 
WAYNE L. REV. 1431, 1485 (2007) (surmising that Hibbs “open[ed] the door, ever so 
slightly, to federal court”). 
44 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2332 (“[Hibbs and Levin] differ markedly in ways bearing 
on the comity calculus.”). 
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Arizona statute awarded tax credits to organizations that 
provided scholarship grants for students who attended private 
elementary and secondary schools.45  The statute did not prevent 
an organization from giving scholarships solely to children who 
attended private, religious institutions.46  A group of Arizona 
taxpayers sued the director of Arizona’s Department of Revenue 
in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the tax 
credits violated the Establishment Clause.47  The plaintiffs asked 
for both injunctive and declaratory relief.48  Because the plaintiffs 
did not and could never enjoy the tax credits at issue, they were 
“outsiders.”49  In Levin, the plaintiffs challenged a state tax 
exemption and sought similar injunctive relief.  The plaintiffs 
were not “outsiders,” according to the Court, because the entire 
point of their lawsuit was that they were taxed differently; they 
“object[ed] to their own tax situation, measured by the allegedly 
more favorable treatment accorded LDCs.”50 
This distinction, however, is not persuasive.  The only 
appreciable difference between the plaintiffs in the two cases, a 
difference to which the Court gives great weight, is that the 
plaintiffs in Levin were direct competitors of the LDCs, whereas 
the plaintiffs in Hibbs had no relationship at all with the 
organizations receiving the tax benefit.51  Justice Thomas made a 
similar point in his concurrence.52  Such a distinction is 
ultimately irrelevant, though, because both sets of plaintiffs 
sought to improve their own position.  The Levin plaintiffs sought 
to undermine their competitors, while the Hibbs plaintiffs sought 
to increase state tax revenue, which would, theoretically, benefit 
all Arizona taxpayers.  Thus, both the majority and concurring 
opinions have fallen prey to one of the very concerns that Justice 
Thomas considered:  The application of the comity doctrine is 
now “little more than a pleading game.”53  Furthermore, one of  
 
 
45 Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 95. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 88. 
48 Id. at 96. 
49 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2335 (“The plaintiffs in Hibbs were outsiders to the tax 
expenditure, ‘third parties’ whose own tax liability was not a relevant factor.”). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 2335–36. 
52 Id. at 2338 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
53 Id. 
 42 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW COMMENTARY [Vol. 84:35  
the plaintiffs in Levin, Gregory Slone, was not objecting to his tax 
burden at all.54  The Court makes no attempt to distinguish his 
position from that of the Hibbs plaintiffs. 
Even if the distinction between the two cases is a real one, it 
does not explain the language used in Hibbs.  The Court plainly 
states in Levin that federal courts used comity to avoid 
interfering with state taxation generally, not state tax collection 
exclusively.55  This statement is in accord with the precedent of 
the Court in its comity cases.56  In an attempt to reconcile the 
rule in Hibbs with the Court’s comity precedent, the Levin Court 
emphasized the status of the plaintiff—outsider or insider—as 
determinative of whether comity should apply.  Yet the language 
of footnote nine in Hibbs makes it clear that the effect of the 
requested relief—specifically, whether the requested relief would 
disrupt state tax revenue—is the determinative factor.57  These 
two statements are at odds and, if not for the Court’s explicit 
statement that its decision in Hibbs “has a more modest reach” 
than the circuit courts had stated,58 it would appear as if Levin 
created a whole new rule, separate and apart from the Hibbs 
rule. 
Unfortunately, the way in which the Court used Levin to 
recast the rule in Hibbs has the result of making the rule less 
concrete.  Though the original Hibbs rule was contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s comity precedent, it at least had the benefit of 
being straightforward and relatively easy to apply.  The new 
Levin rule makes the comity analysis much murkier.  The facts of 
Levin itself demonstrate the difficulties that arise under the new 
rule.  For example, the Court goes through great lengths to 
demonstrate how the plaintiffs are challenging their own tax 
liabilities.  But the Court does not once mention plaintiff Gregory 
Slone, an IM customer.  Unlike the other plaintiffs, he did not 
 
54 See infra Part II. 
55 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2330 (“Comity’s constraint has particular force when 
lower federal courts are asked to pass on the constitutionality of state taxation of 
commercial activity.”). 
56 See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 
586 (1995) (“We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity 
generally counsel that courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state 
tax administration.”). 
57 The decisions of the circuit courts in the wake of Hibbs indicate as much. See 
cases cited supra note 9. 
58 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2332. 
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object to his own tax situation; the tax provisions in question only 
affected the natural gas suppliers.  On the other hand, he does 
stand to benefit from the relief requested, in the form of a lower 
gas bill.  Under the new Levin analysis, it is unclear whether he 
is an insider or an outsider, and it is unclear whether a 
complaint brought by Slone alone could be heard in federal 
court.59 
Perhaps, though, this was the intended result of the majority 
opinion.  As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence, the 
application of comity to the Levin case leaves the door open for 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state taxation cases 
whenever they see fit, just as long as they can frame the plaintiff 
as an “insider.”60  As in the case of plaintiff Slone in Levin, it is 
possible to see him as either an insider or an outsider.  The new 
rule created in Levin decreases certainty in litigation, allows for 
even more confusion among the circuit courts, and potentially 
opens the doors to federal court wider than even the Hibbs 
footnote had. 
II. DOES A FEDERAL COURT HAVE DISCRETION TO CHOOSE 
BETWEEN TWO EQUALLY VALID GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL? 
In supporting its decision to dismiss the case on the basis of 
comity rather than the TIA, the Court cited to two cases which, 
according to the Court, stood for the proposition that a court may 
choose between two equally valid grounds for dismissal.61  In 
 
59 A recent district court decision demonstrates the potential difficulties of the 
Levin rule. In Joseph v. Hyman, the district court held that it could not hear a 
challenge made by commuters to a parking tax exemption given to residents of 
Manhattan. No. 09 Civ. 7555(RJS), 2010 WL 3528854, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 
2010). The court likened the plaintiffs in Joseph to the plaintiffs in Levin, arguing 
that both were, in effect, challenging their own tax liability. Id. at *4. How the 
plaintiffs in Levin and Joseph “objected to an exemption awarded to another 
taxpayer,” and the plaintiffs in Hibbs did not, is left unexplained. Id. Instead, the 
court focused on the plaintiffs’ grounds for their lawsuit: that the “tax differential is 
unconstitutional.” Id. 
60 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2338–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I see only one 
explanation for the Court’s decision to dismiss on a ‘prudential’ ground (comity) 
rather than a mandatory one (jurisdiction): The Court wishes to leave the door open 
to doing in future cases what it did in Hibbs, namely, retain federal jurisdiction over 
constitutional claims that the Court simply does not believe Congress should have 
entrusted to state judges under the Act.” (citations omitted)). 
61 Id. at 2336–37 (majority opinion) (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. 
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299, 301 (1943)). 
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Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, the Court dismissed 
a claim challenging a state tax on comity grounds rather than on 
TIA grounds.62  In Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia 
International Shipping Corp., the Court dismissed a case on 
forum non conveniens grounds rather than on jurisdictional 
grounds.63   
The Court’s reliance on both Great Lakes and Sinochem was 
misplaced; the former is distinguishable and the latter 
contradicts the Court’s conclusion.  The Great Lakes Court chose 
not to apply the TIA because the plaintiff had requested 
declaratory relief, and by its plain language the TIA applied only 
to claims seeking an injunction; had the Court dismissed the case 
under the TIA, it would have expanded the statute in a way 
theretofore unknown.64  Rather than expand the TIA beyond its 
plain statutory language, the Court relied on comity, a doctrine 
already in force.65  That is a situation very different from a court 
facing two equally valid grounds for dismissal.  The Sinochem 
case presented a situation more analogous to the issue in Levin, 
since the Court had two equally valid grounds for dismissing the 
case.  The Court’s decision in Sinochem, however, is at odds with 
the Levin decision.  In Sinochem, the Court wrote: 
If, however, a court can readily determine that it lacks 
jurisdiction over the cause or the defendant, the proper course 
would be to dismiss on that ground. . . .  [W]here subject-matter 
or personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and forum non 
conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of dismissal, 
the court properly takes the less burdensome course.66 
 
 
62 Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 299, 301. 
63 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 436. 
64 Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 299 (“But we find it unnecessary to inquire whether 
the words of the statute may be so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal 
courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax.”). 
65 Id. (“[W]e are of the opinion that those considerations which have led federal 
courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional 
cases, require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure.”). 
The Supreme Court would, eventually, expand the TIA to cover requests for 
declaratory judgment. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 
(1982). 
66 Sinochem, 548 U.S. at 436. 
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The plain language of the Sinochem decision indicates that a 
federal court should dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, unless it 
would be burdensome or difficult to do so.67 
Other cases accord with the language from Sinochem and 
indicate that the Court’s decision in Levin was incorrect.  In 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., upon which Sinochem relied, 
the Court noted that “[i]t is hardly novel for a federal court to 
choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case 
on the merits.”68  Though in that case, the federal court could 
have chosen between two jurisdictional grounds for dismissal, the 
Ruhrgas Court cited to several examples of cases where a federal 
court correctly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds before 
considering any nonjurisdictional grounds for dismissal.69  For 
example, in Ellis v. Dyson, the district court dismissed a case 
based on Younger abstention, a jurisdictional ground for 
dismissal, before considering whether there was a case or in its 
place controversy.70  Thus, the Court’s decisions in Sinochem and 
Ruhrgas indicate that, though a federal court does have 
discretion to choose between equally valid grounds for dismissal, 
a court should dismiss on jurisdictional grounds if they are 
available.  With that understanding of the Court’s precedent, the 
Levin Court should have addressed whether the TIA applied and 
dismissed on those grounds if appropriate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court correctly limited the scope of the 
rule it created in footnote nine of Hibbs v. Winn, it did so in a 
way that is counterproductive.  The new rule pronounced in 
Levin does not make clear which state tax claims a federal court 
may hear and only muddies the waters of the comity doctrine 
further.  The Levin rule essentially allows federal courts to pick 
and choose which state tax claims they want to hear.  Such a rule 
defeats the purpose of comity, which calls for federal judicial 
deference to the rights of the states to self-administration.  To 
 
67 Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2338 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
68 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999); see also Sinochem, 
548 U.S. at 485. 
69 Id. (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1975); Moor v. Cnty. of 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715–16 (1973); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). 
70 Ellis, 421 U.S. at 436 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case so that the district court could reconsider its 
decision in light of a recent Court holding. Id. at 435 (majority opinion). 
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arrive at this result, the Court ignored precedent that called for 
it to analyze the case under the Tax Injunction Act before 
proceeding to a comity analysis.  Again, this serves to undermine 
the comity doctrine, by allowing federal courts to choose which 
state tax claims to hear.  The principles of comity and federalism 
do not call for this result. 
 
